

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 024837

O 082039Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 435

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0089

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT OAU POSTS AS DESIRED

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, OAU, TZ

SUBJECT: MORE THOUGHTS FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 0087

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT NYERERE CALLED ME TO HIS HOME FOR FURTHER NINETY MINUTE TETE-A-TETE ANGOLA THIS EVENING. MAIN PURPOSE WAS FOLLOW UP ON THIS MORNING'S CONVERSATION (REFTEL) AND "TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING WITH US." NET RESULT BRILLIANT PRESENTATION WAS: (A) DETAILING OF NYERERE'S EXPECTED POSITION AT OAU SUMMIT, (B) SOME LOSS OF GROUND ON NEED FOR FOCUS ON SPECIFICS OF REMOVAL RUSSIANS AND CUBANS AND ON WHAT MAY BE EXPECTED OF MPLA IN TAKING AMERICAN CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, BUT FURTHER INDICATIONS THAT (C) NYERERE DOES NOT EXPECT GET OUT IN FRONT OF ANTI-WEST CROWD AT ADDIS, AND (D) WANTS TO KEEP DOOR OPEN FOR DIALOGUE WITH US ON ANGOLA.

1. A FEW HOURS AFTER THIS MORNING'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE (REFTEL), I SAW HIM AGAIN AT NEW YEAR'S RECEPTION FOR DIPLOMATIC CORPS. IN BRIEF EXCHANGE HE SAID OUR EARLIER TALK HAD BEEN ABOUT IMPORTANT THINGS; HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT IT AND WANTED TO THINK MORE. THIS EVENING I RECEIVED WORD THAT PRESIDENT WANTED ME TO COME TO HIS HOUSE AT ONCE. IN HIS SMALL OFFICE THERE, I EXPERIENCED NINETY MINUTE VIRTUOSO PRESENTATION

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ALONG FOLLOWING LINES.

2. NYERERE SAID HE HAD BEEN REVIEWING MORNING'S CONVERSATIONS. HE MEANT WHAT HE HAD SAID BUT THERE HAD BEEN SO MUCH MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, HE DID NOT WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY MORE IF WE CAME TO BELIEVE THAT WHAT HE SAID AND DID AT ADDIS AND SUBSEQUENTLY DID NOT APPEAR CORRESPOND TO WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME IN DAR. HE WAS THEREFORE GOING TO GO OVER WITH ME EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DO AT ADDIS AND WHAT INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD GIVEN HIS "BOYS" WHO WERE ALREADY THERE.

3. TANZANIA WAS GOING TO:

(A) CONCENTRATE ON SOUTH AFRICA. THIS WAS ONLY THING ON WHICH AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. OAU WAS USEFUL AND HE WISHED PRESERVE IT. HE BELIEVED MAJORITY OF OAU WOULD SOON RECOGNIZE MPLA (THOUGH PROBABLY NOT DURING NEXT FEW DAYS AT ADDIS). HE WAS GOING TO ENCOURAGE THIS BUT HE WAS NOT GOING TO FORCE ISSUE BECAUSE THIS WOULD MAKE FOR DISUNITY AND RUN COUNTER TO (B) BELOW.

(B) TANZANIA WILL SEEK NOT TO EMBARRASS THE US AND THE WEST AND WILL TRY TO DETER OTHERS FROM DOING SO, THOUGH THE US WOULD INEVITABLY GET SPLATTERED A LITTLE IN THE PROCESS OF CONCENTRATING ON SOUTH AFRICA. (HE DID NOT SPECIFY "OTHERS" BUT I SUSPECT HE HAD NIGERIA PARTICULARLY IN MIND.). THIS APPROACH IS BASED ON TWO FACTORS: NYERERE IS NOT "FRIEND OF RUSSIANS" (HE REPEATED THIS SEVERAL TIMES.) AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO SEE MPLA PUSHED CLOSER TO THEM. ALSO, HE BELIEVES THE MORE THE US IS HARRASSED, THE MORE IT WILL DIG IN. ONLY FOOLS DO THAT TO A GREAT POWER.

4. IN WIDE-RANGING BACKGROUND DISCUSSION, NYERERE TALKED OF HIS EXPERIENCES WITH AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. HE SAID HE HAD CONVINCED FRELIMO TO POINT WHERE THEY HAD ENDED UP DISAGREEING WITH THEIR CHINESE SUPPORTERS ON ANGOLA. HE HAD GOTTEN ARMS FROM THE PORTUGUESE, "FROM THE PORTUGUESE, FOR GOD'S SAKE*" FOR UNITA, BUT BY THE TIME THE ARMS HAD ARRIVED IN TANZANIA, THE PORTUGUESE WERE GONE FROM ANGOLA, AND UNITA WOULD HAVE USED ARMS ONLY AGAINST OTHER ANGOLANS, SO HE HAD REFUSED TO TURN OVER ARMS. HE WOULD HAVE TREATED THE MPLA THE

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SAME WAY UNDER SAME CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. ONE OF THE US'S GREAT ADVANTAGES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, NYERERE SAID, WAS THAT ITS POLICY COULD WITH SOME JUSTICE BE SAID TO BE IN ACCORD WITH OAU'S PRESENT POLICY FAVORING ROLE FOR ALL THREE PARTIES. THAT OAU POLICY WAS GOING TO CHANGE AND IF US APPROACH DID NOT CHANGE WITH IT, ADVANTAGE WOULD BE LOST. AS FOR THE MPLA, HE KNEW NETO PRETTY WELL. NETO HAD

ONCE SAT IN THIS SAME OFFICE AND SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO FEAR FROM THE RUSSIANS AND WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AS MUCH SUPPORT FROM THE RUSSIANS FOR AS LONG AS HE COULD GET IT. NYERERE HAD SAID: "NOTHING, EXCEPT THAT THE RUSSIANS, NOT YOU, WILL HAVE WON YOUR COUNTRY'S FREEDOM; YOU WILL NO LONGER BE A NON-ALIGNED AFRICAN; AND YOU WILL BRING THE RUSSIANS' ENEMIES DOWN ON YOU." NETO WAS BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND. HE WOULD STILL BE FRIENDLY WITH THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS, BUT AFTER HE HAD CONSOLIDATED HIS VICTORY, HE WOULD NEVER GIVE BASES OR MAINTAIN SOVIET OR CUBAN TROOPS.

6. I SAID I BELIEVED I UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION. I WOULD COMMUNICATE IT. I APPRECIATED HIS DESIRE AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT SOME OF THE POINTS HE HAD MENTIONED THIS MORNING BUT NOT YET TOUCHED ON THIS EVENING REMAINED OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. WAS HE STILL GOING TO REMIND MPLA THAT RUSSIANS WERE TALKING TO IT AND TO US WHILE IT WAS TALKING ONLY TO RUSSIANS? DID HE STILL AGREE ON THE UTILITY OF FOCUSING ON A,B,C,DS OF SOVIETS AND CUBAN REMOVAL?

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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0089

EXDIS

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7. HE SAID HE WAS DEFINITELY GOING TO POINT OUT AS FORCEFULLY AS HE COULD TO MPLA THAT IT SHOULD SEEK TO LEARN AND UNDERSTAND US AND OTHER AFRICAN CONCERNS. HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A POINT, SINCE WE WERE NOW SPEAKING SO FREELY: IF THE MPLA WAS TALKING ONLY TO THE RUSSIANS, THE US WAS TALKING ONLY TO FNLA/UNITA. WHY DIDN'T WE TAKE INITIATIVE?

I ASKED IF THIS MEANT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD HAVE SOMEONE AVAILABLE AT ADDIS FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE SAID: "NO. NOT AT ADDIS. I WON'T BE ABLE TO MOVE THEM THAT SOON BUT I THINK I WILL MOVE THEM. I WILL LET YOU KNOW WHEN I THINK THE TIME HAS COME." HE ADDED THAT WHAT WE HAD TALKED ABOUT THIS MORNING WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH OTHER AFRICANS. IT NEED NOT BE EXPECTED TO SHOW UP PUBLICLY. THIS IS ANOTHER POINT TO REMEMBER IN AVOIDING MISUNDERSTANDING.

8. ON IMPORTANCE SPECIFICS RE SOVIET/CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, HE SAID, HAVING THOUGHT MATTER OVER AGAIN AND AGAIN, HE WANTED AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING THIS ALSO. HE COULD AND WOULD DO A FEW THINGS WITH FRELIMO AND SOME OTHER AFRICANS, BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT, INADQUATE AS IT MIGHT SEEM TO ME, HE HAD BETTER STICK TO WHAT WAS REALLY HIS CORE BELIEF ON THIS: (A) NO AFRICAN COUNTRY HAS EVER GONE COMMUNIST, AND (B) AFRICAN COUNTRIES WILL ALWAYS FIND ENOUGH UNITY AMONG THEMSELVES TO PREVENT SUPER-POWER DOMINATION OF ONE OF THEM--EVEN IF A PARTICULAR COUNTRY MIGHT WANT TO ACCEPT SUCH DOMINATION AT SECRET

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A GIVEN TIME. HE COULD UNDERSTAND IF US DID NOT THINK THAT WAS VERY STRONG MEDICINE BUT HE DEEPLY BELIEVED THAT IT WAS.

9. REVERTING TO HIS "CONCENTRATE ON SOUTH AFRICA" POLICY AT OAU, I ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN SHOULD SOUTH AFRICA GET OUT BEFORE THE CONCENTRATION REALLY GOT GINNED UP. WOULD US AND WEST BE SUBSTITUTE TARGET? HE SAID "NOT IF I CAN HELP IT. THAT WOULD JUST MAKE YOU DIG IN DEEPER. IN THAT CASE, WE WILL CONCENTRATE ON WHAT A BAD THING SOUTH AFRICA HAD DONE AND HOW IT MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO DO SUCH A THING AGAIN."

10. COMMENT: NYERERE'S EVENING THOUGHTS STRIKE ME AS SOMETHING OF A PULL-BACK FROM HIS MORNING ONES, AND I SAID SO AS POLITELY AS I COULD. I SUSPECT HE IS GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GENERATING FURTHER MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE US BY NON-PERFORMANCE AND THAT THAT WAS THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE LATE-HOUR SESSION. DURING AFTERNOON, HE MAY HAVE REVIEWED--OR COMPLETED--WITH ADVISERS HIS OAU GAME PLAN AND DECIDED THAT HIS MODEST VALOR SHOULD BE TEMPERED BY MODEST DISCRETION. HE MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT BEST UNLOAD FULL RANGE OF HIS BRILLIANTLY PRESENTED BUT NOT REALLY VERY FORTH-COMING THOUGHTS ON LOCAL AMBASSADOR (ME) RATHER THAN TRY CONVEY THEM IN MORE FORMAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT FORD. (HE GAVE NO INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT STILL INTEND ANSWER PRESIDENT'S LETTER AFTER OAU SUMMIT.) IN ANY CASE, HE CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT HIS SIMPLE ANSWER TO PROBLEM OF SOVIET/CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IS RIGHT ONE.

11. NET RESULT OF ALL OF THIS, REGRETTABLY, DOES NOT STRIKE ME AS VERY IMPRESSIVE. BUT, STILL, NYERERE IS NOT OUT WITH GRANDSTANDERS LIKE NIGERIA ON THIS ISSUE AT LEAST, AND HE IS DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE TIME AND ENERGY TO TRYING TO KEEP ANGOLA DIALOGUE OPEN WITH US. THIS TOO IS IN CONTRAST WITH TANZANIA'S PERFORMANCE ON OTHER RECENT ISSUES).
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